Missouri Court of Appeals Doesn’t Reverse Conviction Despite Prosecutor’s Comment During Closing That Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt is Less Than 87% Probablity
It is well established that prosecutors are not allowed to try to quantify the concept of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt during closing arguments. A prosecutor did just that in State v. Munguia-Hernandez, 2026 WL 1345991 (Mo.App. 2026), but it wasn’t enough for the Missouri Court of Appeals to reverse. Why?
In Munguia-Hernandez, the defendant was charged with domestic assault in the fourth degree and invasion of privacy. During closing arguments, the prosecutor told the jury that
To find [Appellant] guilty, you just have to believe beyond a reasonable doubt, which is defined to you as firmly convinced. What firmly convinced means is for you to decide.
We’re humans. We don’t have, like, 87 percent probability. Like, that’s not how it works.
Defense counsel then objected and moved for a mistrial, but the judge denied the motion. Ultimately, the judge instructed the jury as follows on the presumption of innocence and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt:
This presumption of innocence places upon the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] is guilty.
A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of [Appellant]’s guilt. The law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt.
If after your consideration of all the evidence you are firmly convinced that [Appellant] is guilty of the crime charged, you will find him guilty. If you are not so convinced, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.
In denying the defendant relief, the Court of Appeals concluded that
The prosecutor’s statement, while inartful, did not rise to the level of reversible error. The State referenced the proper standard, informing the jury that proof beyond a reasonable doubt required them to be firmly convinced of Appellant’s guilt. The additional remark regarding “87 percent probability” was brief and not emphasized.
Moreover, we assume the jury obeyed the trial court’s directions and followed its instructions.
I disagree. In my mind, the prosecutor’s comment on guilt beyond a reasonable doubt tried to clarify for the jurors that the proper standard did not require 87% certainty. And I see nothing in the court’s instruction that could have corrected this impression.