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Editor: Colin Miller

9th Circuit Reverses Conviction Based on Judge Telling Holdout Juror to Surrender His Opinion Regarding Expert’s “Irrelevant” Testimony on Defendant’s Autism

The Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant “being tried by a jury is entitled to the uncoerced verdict of that body.” Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241 (1988). It’s rare for an appellate court to find that a trial judge coerced a verdict out of a juror, but a good example can be found in the recent case, United States v. Chapman, 175 F.4th 1118 (9th Cir. 2026).

In Chapman, John Chapman was charged with kidnapping resulting in death. The evidence established that Chapman had “autism, Tourette syndrome, Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.” At trial,

the defense primarily relied on the testimony of Dr. Christopher Boys, a pediatric neuropsychologist, who spoke primarily about Chapman’s diagnoses of autism spectrum disorder, Tourette syndrome, and ADHD. Dr. Boys testified that, primarily due to his autism, Chapman would have had deficits in understanding non-verbal communication. Dr. Boys also testified about “theory of the mind,” a concept in which a person can understand the perspective and emotions of another person, and how Chapman would have lacked this skill because of his autism. Dr. Boys also testified that Chapman likely would not have good planning skills due to his ADHD.

During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court stating: “There is one juror that would like to be replaced by the alternate. Is that an option? Due to the juror using biased opinion.” This was Juror Number 11, who told the judge that he was not basing his “holdout vote on personal feelings but rather was ‘following the evidence,’ particularly the testimony of Dr. Boys.”

Thereafter,

The district court continued to intensely question Juror Number 11, asking whether Juror Number 11 was suggesting that the foreman was “just making…up” that Juror Number 11 was basing the holdout vote on personal feelings and questioned Juror Number 11 about the specific testimony of Dr. Boys. When Juror Number 11 tried to say that Dr. Boys explained that autistic individuals sometimes cannot interpret nonverbal communication, the court told Juror Number 11, “[s]ee but that’s irrelevant. That’s irrelevant. It doesn’t matter…It’s not like you’ve gotta follow that.”

Juror Number 11 then tried to respond, explaining that expert testimony is evidence as explained by the court, but the court replied:

[B]ut when it conflicts with the instructions I give you, you need to follow the instructions I give you, not — not go off and say, “Well, wait, one of the witnesses” — I mean, and I can’t control the witnesses. I don’t know what they may say. But we can’t just say, “Well, that witness said blah, blah, blah and so I can’t — I can’t deliberate.”

Finally, “[a]fter this exchange, Juror Number 11 thanked the court, and the court repeated that Juror Number 11 would ‘have to surrender that opinion’ and would have to base the verdict decision ‘[o]n the evidence and not on something you remember some doctor said.'”

In reversing Chapman’s conviction based on coercion, the Ninth Circuit concluded, inter alia, that

the district court’s comments when canvassing Juror Number 11 were coercive under the “totality of the circumstances.”…“[T]he form of the instruction” was coercive because the district court explicitly told Juror Number 11 to “surrender that opinion,” that the evidence on which Juror Number 11 was relying was “irrelevant,” and that the evidence Juror Number 11 was considering “doesn’t matter.”…We have previously held that directing a jury to focus on certain portions of evidence is coercive, just as is disparaging or minimizing evidence that a juror says they are relying upon.