It’s So Juvenile: Ohio Child Custody Case Reveals Differences Between Federal And Ohio Rules On Juvenile Adjudication Impeachment

Federal Rule of Evidence 609(d) provides that

Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.

As the recent opinion of the Court of Appeals Of Ohio, Twelfth District, in In re L.E.N., 2011 WL 1346825 (Ohio App. 12 Dist. 2011), makes clear, Ohio Rule of Evidence 609(d) is actually more restrictive than its federal counterpart although this distinction was ultimately irrelevant to the court’s opinion.

In re L.E.N. was an appeal by a father from a decision granting legal custody of his daughter, L.E.N., to the child’s biological mother. Part of the basis for the father’s appeal was that the trial court improperly refused to admit evidence of L.E.N.’s stepfather’s juvenile record as impeachment evidence. In finding that the trial court acted properly, the Court of Appeals noted that Ohio Rule of Evidence 609(d) provides that “Evidence of juvenile adjudications is not admissible except as provided by statute enacted by the General Assembly.”

In other words, under Ohio Rule of Evidence 609(d), juvenile adjudications are never admissible as impeachment evidence (without statutory authorization) while under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(d), juvenile adjudications are sometime admissible in criminal trials against witnesses other than accuseds. So, why does Federal Rule of Evidence 609(d) sometimes allow for the admission of juvenile adjudications as impeachment evidence? Well, according to the accompanying Advisory Committee’s Note,

The prevailing view has been that a juvenile adjudication is not usable for impeachment. Thomas v. United States, 74 App.D.C. 167, 121 F.2d 905 (1941); Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1966). This conclusion was based upon a variety of circumstances. By virtue of its informality, frequently diminished quantum of required proof, and other departures from accepted standards for criminal trials under the theory of parens patriae, the juvenile adjudication was considered to lack the precision and general probative value of the criminal conviction. While In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), no doubt eliminates these characteristics insofar as objectionable, other obstacles remain. Practical problems of administration are raised by the common provisions in juvenile legislation that records be kept confidential and that they be destroyed after a short time. While Gault was skeptical as to the realities of confidentiality of juvenile records, it also saw no constitutional obstacles to improvement. 387 U.S. at 25, 87 S.Ct. 1428. See also Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 Colum.L.Rev. 281, 289 (1967). In addition, policy considerations much akin to those which dictate exclusion of adult convictions after rehabilitation has been established strongly suggest a rule of excluding juvenile adjudications. Admittedly, however, the rehabilitative process may in a given case be a demonstrated failure, or the strategic importance of a given witness may be so great as to require the overriding of general policy in the interests of particular justice. See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 87 S.Ct. 793, 17 L.Ed.2d 737 (1967). Wigmore was outspoken in his condemnation of the disallowance of juvenile adjudications to impeach, especially when the witness is the complainant in a case of molesting a minor. 1 Wigmore § 196; 3 Id. §§ 924a, 980. The rule recognizes discretion in the judge to effect an accommodation among these various factors by departing from the general principle of exclusion. In deference to the general pattern and policy of juvenile statutes, however, no discretion is accorded when the witness is the accused in a criminal case.

-CM