In Conclusion: Court Of Appeals Of Texas Seemingly Errs In Applying Rule 704 To Legal Conclusions

Like its federal counterpart, Texas Rule of Evidence 704 provides that

Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.

But while witnesses may embrace ultimate issues in their testimony, they may not offer ultimate legal conclusions, a distinction seemingly missed by the Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston, in its recent opinion in Ruiz-Angeles v. State, 2011 WL 3447468 (Tex.App.-Houston [14 Dist.] 2011).

In Ruiz-Angeles, Israel Ruiz-Angeles was cited for failure to control his speed and colliding with another vehicle on January 30, 2006. This occurred after Ruiz-Angeles drove his vehicle into the back of a vehicle driven by Laura Dahlkemper, an event witnessed by Christian Moore. After the close of the evidence,

The jury deliberated for seven minutes, unanimously found appellant guilty, and assessed a fine of $200. The municipal court denied appellant’s motion for new trial, and he appealed to County Criminal Court at Law No. 14. The county court affirmed the municipal court’s judgment….

Ruiz-Angeles thereafter appealed, claiming, inter alia, “that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the prosecutor’s questions to two witnesses as to whether other drivers used due care and whether their vehicles were in compliance with the law.” Specifically,

When the prosecutor asked Moore whether he had reason to believe that Dahlkemper failed to exercise the duty to use due care, appellant objected that the question called for a conclusion of law. He raised the same objection when the prosecutor asked Dahlkemper whether she was operating her car in compliance with the law and whether appellant failed to control his speed. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in overruling these objections because, according to appellant, a witness is not permitted to give an opinion on an ultimate fact. 

The Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston, disagreed, concluding that “such testimony is expressly permitted under the Texas Rules of Evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 704 (“Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”).”

I disagree. It is true that “[t]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” But at the same time, “[a] witness…may not state a legal conclusion.” Young v. State, 2010 WL 2638083 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2010). And that is exactly what Moore and Dahlkemper did. They did not merely testify that Ruiz-Angeles was speeding or driving unsafely and they did not merely testify that Dahlkemper was driving within the speed limit or driving safely. Instead, they testified that Dahlkemper whether she was operating her car in compliance with the law, that Dahlkemper exercised the duty to use due care, and that Ruiz-Angeles failed to control his speed. These are all improper legal conclusions that told the jury how to decide the case. Therefore, the testimony was improper under Texas Rule of Evidence 704.

-CM