On Your Side?: Delaware Court Deems Report by Nationwide Expert Inadmissible in Car Accident Case

Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 provides that

If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

Sometimes, a court precludes an expert from testifying because he’s not qualified to offer opinions on a matter. For instance, a court would not allow an attorney or even a dermatologist to offer opinion testimony about the cause of a victim’s death. 

Other times, a court precludes an expert from testifying because anyone would be qualified to offer opinions about a matter. This is what happened in the recent case of Knott v. Covert, 2015 WL 196730 (Del.Supr. 2015).

In Knott, Jeffrey Knott’s automobile was rear-ended by Deborah Covert’s vehicle. Subsequently, Knott filed a lawsuit against Covert and Nationwide General Insurance Company, who was his insurer at the time of the accident. Prior to trial, Covert filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude the expert report and testimony of Nationwide‘s expert witness, William C. Camlin. Specifically, according to Covert,

Camlin’s report [wa]s based upon the “statements and depositions of Plaintiff and Defendant Covert,” “the photographs of Plaintiff’s and Defendant Covert’s vehicles,” and “the accident report.” From these materials, Camlin observed “a slight scuff mark in the approximate center of the rear bumper with slight scratches on the leading edge of the rear bumper in the ara of the meeting for the trunk lid.” Camlin further concluded that the damage to the rear bumper could not have been caused by vehicular impact, as claimed by Plaintiff. It [wa]s Defendant Covert’s position that these observations are not “scientific, technical and/or specialized,” and could easily be grasped by a lay jury. As such, the testimony is not instructive.

The court agreed, concluding that

Covert’s point is well taken. In Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, as in the case at bar, the purported expert testimony of the witness, was more in line with “common sense” than expertise. Camlin’s note regarding the location of the scuff mark on the rear of the car is something “within the common knowledge of the jury,” and further something the jury is “equally competent to form an opinion about.” The jury, like Camlin, is capable of reviewing the materials, for example: the photographs, to determine the position of the scuff mark.

Accordingly, the court granted the motion in limine and deemed Camlin’s report and testimony inadmissible.

-CM