The Prior Inconsistent Statement Project, Part 8 (Colorado)

Colorado is another jurisdiction I have identified as a possible jurisdictions where a recanted prior inconsistent statement not given subject to the penalty of perjury might be sufficient to support a conviction. Let’s take a look at the case law.

The relevant case here is Montoya v. State, 740 P.2d 992 (Colo. 1987). In Montoya, Ronald Montoya was charged with sexual assault on a child. 

The charge was filed on the basis of statements made to social workers and a police officer by the defendant’s stepdaughters, K.W. and T.W., who were then thirteen and eleven years of age respectively, alleging that the defendant had sexually assaulted K.W. at their home in Northglenn, Colorado, on March 3, 1982.

Moreover, the mother of these children told a social worker “that the defendant had admitted to her that he had assaulted K.W.” At trial, however, all three witnesses recanted. After Montoya was convicted, he appealed. His appeal, however, was focused upon whether the prior inconsistent statements by these witnesses were admissible, not whether their prior inconsistent statements were sufficient to support his conviction. Finding that these statements were admissible, the Supreme Court of Colorado sustained their convictions.

Therefore, it seems fair to say that the court did not address the sufficiency issue. As noted in 4 Jones on Evidence § 26:32.50, “The court did not explicitly discuss whether such statements, without more, sufficed to convict; the focus was on whether such statements could be admitted as substantive evidence.”

-CM