Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama Finds Wife’s Statement Accusing Husband of Murder Was Not a Statement Against Interest
Similar to it its federal counterpart, Alabama Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) provides an exception to the rule against hearsay
A statement which was at the time of its making so contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.
Usually, this “statement against interest” exception is used for statements that are clearly against the speaker’s pecuniary or proprietary interest. For example, if Will said, “I owe Paul $500,” that would clearly be a statement against pecuniary interest. Similarly, if Wanda said, “Paula has an easement across my property,” that would clearly be a statement against proprietary interest. But what if Wanda said, “My husband killed Vince?” This was the question addressed by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama in its recent opinion in Sheffield v. State, 2017 WL 1034568 (Ala.Crim.App. 2017).
In Sheffield, Larry Sheffield was charged with murder in connection with the shooting death of Jeffrey McMillan. At his trial, Larry’s wife Sheila invoked her spousal privilege, which prompted the prosecution to admit recordings of conversations between Larry and Sheila. Here was one pertinent portion:
SHEILA: You’re a guilty son of a bitch.
SHEFFIELD: Sheila. Sheila.SHEILA: Guilty, guilty, guilty.
SHEFFIELD: Sheila.
After he was convicted, Larry appealed, claiming, inter alia, that Sheila’s side of this recording was improperly admitted under Alabama Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). In resolving the issue, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama began by citing C. Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence, § 249.01(1)(b)(6th ed. 2009), which states that
Sometimes it will be absolutely clear that the declaration was against the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest. At other times, however, the question of whether the declaration is against one’s pecuniary or proprietary interest is unascertainable from the declaration alone. In these latter cases the courts must look at surrounding circumstances in addition to the statement. A declarant’s acknowledgment that he is a partner, for example, might be a declaration against interest if the partnership is insolvent but not if it is enjoying healthy solvency. The context of the statement may be highly relevant in determining whether it was a statement for or against the declarant’s interest.
In those instances where a statement could be for as well as against the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, some courts have determined the status of the statement by asking whether the primary motive of the declarant, at the time the declarant made the statement, was to aid or derogate the declarant’s own self-interest. Only if the against-interest motive predominates does the statement qualify.
The court then noted that this was an issue of first impression of Alabama because it could “find no Alabama caselaw that speaks directly to whether a declarant’s statements made against her spouse’s penal interest may also be considered contrary to her own pecuniary or proprietary interest.” The court did, however, find two Oregon cases where courts had found similar statements inadmissible under the “statement against interest” exception.
The Alabama court then reached this same conclusion, finding that
The record gives no indication that Sheila’s statements were, at the time of their making, against her pecuniary or proprietary interest. If anything, Sheila’s statements that she was afraid of Sheffield and wanted to end their marriage indicate that Sheila would benefit from Sheffield’s possible conviction and prison sentence. Any determination of Sheila’s motive, however, would be speculative because Sheila was not available for cross-examination. Therefore, we cannot affirmatively decide whether an against-interest motive of Sheila’s statements predominates any favorable-interest motive behind Sheila’s statements.
Moreover, the primary effect of Sheila’s statements was to expose Sheffield to criminal punishment. Any pecuniary or proprietary loss to Sheffield would have been indirect, and any such loss to Sheila would have been even more remote. Therefore, we cannot say that a reasonable person in Sheila’s situation would have considered the risk to her pecuniary or proprietary interest so great or so direct that she would not lie. Under the circumstances of this case, the risk of loss to Sheila was too attenuated to ensure that her statements were inherently reliable. Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted Sheila’s statements….
I think that this was the correct conclusion, but I wonder how much Sheila wanting to end the marriage played into the analysis. Would the result have been different if Sheila and Larry were in a loving relationship that Sheila wanted to maintain?
I also wonder about the efficacy of the “primary motive” test referenced in Alabama Evidence. The “statement against interest” exception largely covers careless statements, where a declarant makes a statement he shouldn’t make. Therefore, I’m not sure how much sense it makes to look at the “primary motive” of the speaker, but I’d like to see a closer case before challenging it further.
-CM