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Editor: Colin Miller

7th Circuit Finds Jury Coercion When Juror Said During Post-Verdict Polling That He Was “Forced Into” Voting Guilty

It is well established that 

“Any criminal defendant…being tried by a jury is entitled to the uncoerced verdict of that body.”…Impermissible coercion occurs “when jurors surrender their honest opinions for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.” United States v. Banks, 2020 WL 7414646 (7th Cir. 2020).

So, what should a judge do when she believes that there might have been jury coercion? According to the Seventh Circuit, not what the district judge did in Banks.

In Banks, “Tanisha Banks was indicted on charges of conspiracy and aiding and abetting a robbery of the United States Post Office.” After the jury returned guilty verdicts, the judge polled the jurors. When she got to the fifth juror — Juror No. 32 — the following colloquy occurred:

THE COURT: Juror No. 32, is this your verdict as to Ms. Banks?
JUROR NO. 32: Forced into.
THE COURT: Is this your verdict?
JUROR NO. 32: I suppose so.
THE COURT: Is it your verdict that she is guilty on both Counts One and Two?
JUROR NO. 32: I don’t know how to answer that.
THE COURT: I’m asking you to answer that at this time.
JUROR NO. 32: I feel like I need more time.
THE COURT: Let me go finish the poll, and then I’ll come back to you (emphasis added).

The judge then polled the remaining jurors, who all affirmed the verdict. Next, the judge sent the jury back to continue deliberating after giving the following instruction:

At this time, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, because the verdict that you have returned…with regard to Ms. Tanisha Banks does not appear to be unanimous given the polling of the jury, the [c]ourt is going to direct that you return to your deliberations with regard to Ms. Banks at this time—it’s about five minutes after 9:00—and to continue your best, good faith efforts in doing so to attempt to come to a unanimous verdict with regard to Ms. Banks.

29 minutes later, the jury again returned with guilty verdicts, this time with no issue when the jury was polled.

On appeal, Tanisha sought reversal based on jury coercion. The Seventh agreed for three reasons.

First,

Continuing to poll the jury after one juror disagrees with the verdict does not automatically amount to reversible coercion….But…continued polling in this situation is relevant to the coercion inquiry because it undoubtedly puts pressure on the holdout juror….That is why we have endorsed the “wise” approach of terminating the poll as soon as a lack of unanimity is revealed. The judge here did not follow that advice. Had she done so, no one (save for the other jurors) would know whether Juror 32 was alone in his disagreement or one of several dissenters.

Second, the Seventh Circuit noted that it had previously noted

the importance of reminding jurors “not to surrender their honest beliefs” just to reach a unanimous verdict. The judge’s supplemental instruction lacked this important reminder. To be sure, the judge did ask the jury to continue deliberating in “good faith.” But the heart of the coercion inquiry is whether a juror “surrender[s his] honest opinions for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.”…The likelihood of coercion would have been diminished had the judge’s supplemental instruction included this important warning.

Third, there was the fact the jury later came back after only 29 minutes of renewed deliberations. The court

conclude[d] with a few words about the length of the jury’s renewed deliberations. A verdict returned very quickly after the jury is given a supplemental instruction to continue deliberations may signal that a juror was coerced….While longer deliberations indicate the jurors took time to “reexamine [their] own views” and “consult with one another,”…shorter deliberations may support an inference of a “coercive effect of the majority running roughshod over the minority.”…The circumstances support the latter inference here. The jury returned its second verdict against Banks just 29 minutes after being instructed to continue deliberating. That rapid turnaround suggests that Juror 32 may have felt pressured into surrendering his views for the sole purpose of returning a unanimous verdict.

-CM