Eighth Circuit Punts on Question of Whether Statements to a Chemical Dependency Counselor Satisfy Hearsay Exception

Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) provides an exception to the rule against hearsay for

A statement that:

(A) is made for — and is reasonably pertinent to — medical diagnosis or treatment; and

(B) describes medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause.

So, would a suspect’s statement to a chemical dependency counselor during his post-arrest evaluation satisfy Rule 803(4)? That was the question (not) addressed by the Eighth Circuit in its recent opinion in United States v. Hoeft, 2025 WL 397110 (8th Cir. 2025).

In Hoeft,

Around 9:45 one morning, three police officers responded to a call from the manager of a gated storage facility. The manager had reported that someone who “didn’t belong there” was “passed out behind the wheel” of a small white pickup. Inside the gate, the officers saw a truck matching that description halfway down an alley of storage units and noticed that its lights were on. They parked their squad cars in a way that arguably blocked the alley, and they approached on foot.

As the officers got closer, they saw [Michael] Hoeft asleep in the driver’s seat with a key in the ignition and a loaded crossbow on the passenger seat. One officer reached inside the open driver’s-side window to make sure the truck was off, waking Hoeft up in the process. In what started as a friendly exchange, Hoeft told her that he was doing “better than average” and had just stopped there to “take some crap out of the back.” But things quickly escalated.

The officer told Hoeft to step out of the truck because the crossbow made her nervous, but Hoeft refused, insisting that he had a storage unit there. So the officers tased him, dragged him out, and arrested him. Searching Hoeft and his truck, the officers found four baggies containing a total of about 70 grams of methamphetamine, some syringes, a scale, a .22 caliber handgun, and—of course—the crossbow.

Hoeft was later convicted of crimes including possessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine.

On appeal, Hoeft claimed that the trial court erred by precluding a a chemical dependency counselor from testifying about statements he made to her during his post-arrest evaluation which would have supported the theory that the methamphetamine was for personal consumption, not distribution. The Eighth Circuit addressed this claim as follows:

We end with Hoeft’s claim that the district court should have allowed a chemical dependency counselor to testify about what he said to her during a post-arrest evaluation. Hoeft told her that he was using two “eight-balls” (totaling about seven grams) a day when he was arrested. This out-of-court statement would have bolstered Hoeft’s in-court testimony to the same effect and refuted the Government’s evidence that even a “chronic binge use[r]” uses only about five grams a day. Hoeft argued that his statement was admissible under the hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). But the district court excluded it, reasoning that Hoeft had an incentive to fudge the numbers so he would be charged with mere possession….

We ordinarily review “evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, but where constitutional rights are implicated, ‘we consider the matter de novo.’” …We will reverse only if the error “affected substantial rights or had more than a slight influence on the verdict.”…

We do not decide whether the district court erred because we conclude that its decision to exclude the statement was harmless. Hoeft took the stand and discussed his daily drug use, so his out-of-court statement would not have introduced anything new into evidence. At most, it would have padded his in-court testimony. Under these circumstances, excluding the statement had no more than a slight influence on the verdict.

-CM