Supreme Court of Connecticut Reverses Stabbing Conviction Based on Improperly Admitted Character Evidence

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1)-(2) provides that

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.

(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.

Moreover, evidence that is submitted under Rule 404(b)(2) is subjected to the traditional balancing test under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which provides that

The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.

Rule 403 is a liberal rule of admissibility, under which it is difficult for a defendant to get evidence excluded.

In its forthcoming opinion in State v. Marcello E., the Supreme Court of Connecticut made clear that it is easier for Connecticut defendants to get bad character evidence excluded from trial than their federal counterparts.

In Marcello E., a jury found the defendant, Marcello E., guilty of assault in the first degree based on the stabbing of his ex-girlfriend. At trial, over objection, the judge allowed for the prosecution to introduce evidence of two prior violent acts Marcello E. had allegedly committed against his ex-girlfriend to prove his intent.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut noted that

‘‘[w]e have developed a two part test to determine the admissibility of such evidence. First, the evidence must be relevant and material to at least one of the circumstances encompassed by the exceptions [set forth in § 4-5 (c) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence]….Second, the probative value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect.’’

From this, you can see the key difference. Under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403, character evidence proffered for permissible purposes is presumptively admissible and will only be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 

On the other hand, under § 4-5 (c) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, character evidence is presumptively inadmissible and will only be admitted if its probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. Applying this test the Supreme Court of Connecticut found that the character evidence was improperly admitted and reversed the conviction, concluding as follows:

We agree with the defendant that the slight probative value of the prior misconduct evidence did not outweigh its prejudicial effect. The prior misconduct evidence was admitted as relevant solely to prove the assailant’s specific intent to commit the charged offense, not his motive or identity. Because the trial court was on notice, before it ruled on the admissibility of the prior misconduct evidence, that (1) there would be ample other evidence demonstrating the assailant’s specific intent, (2) the assailant’s identity, not his intent, was truly what would be at issue, and (3) the victim would testify early in the trial about the prior misconduct and then identify the defendant as her assailant, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by prematurely admitting the prior misconduct evidence, considering that its value was ‘‘marginal and its prejudicial tendencies clear.’’…

Prior to the start of evidence, the prosecutor summarized for the court the nature of the charged conduct, highlighting that the victim intended to testify that she had been stabbed multiple times, causing ‘‘significant injury to her legs and to her head.’’ The prosecutor anticipated that the victim would then ‘‘testify that [the defendant] is the individual who stabbed me.’’ The court also was put on notice at that time that the anticipated main issue at trial would not be the assailant’s specific intent but, rather, ‘‘who assaulted her.’’ The court should have recognized that admitting the prior misconduct evidence was unduly prejudicial, at least at the time it was admitted, because it would presuppose the determinative issue at trial—the assailant’s identity— while only advancing a slight probative value and doing so in a cumulative fashion. Its failure to do so, particularly considering the state of the pretrial record and that the prior misconduct evidence, at the very least, came up to the ‘‘fine line’’ of impermissible propensity evidence, constituted an abuse of discretion.5 State v. Beavers, 290 Conn. 386, 405 n.19, 963 A.2d 956 (2009).

-CM