Supreme Court of Washington Finds Defense’s Introduction of Hearsay Statement Accusing Someone Else of an Assault Opened the Door For Statement by Same Speaker Accusing the Defendant
Washington Rule of Evidence 106, the “rule of completeness,” provides that
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the party at that time to introduce any other part, or any other writing or recorded statement, which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.
Last week, the Supreme Court of Washington issued maybe the most interesting “rule of completeness” opinion I’ve even seen in State v. Bennett, 2026 WL 111666 (Wash. 2026).
Here were the basic facts of the case:
Ralph Kinerson was stabbed on the evening of April 12, 2022. Although the details of the incident are disputed, both Kinerson and [Barclay] Bennett testified that they physically fought that evening. Kinerson testified that he was at his home with an acquaintance, Abbey Pearson, when he heard a knock at the door. Through the peephole, he saw a man with his head down. As soon as he unbolted the door, it was forced open and he was immediately attacked. He and the other man wrestled to the ground, and the assailant began stabbing Kinerson. During the struggle, Kinerson recognized his assailant as Bennett, the husband of Robyn Roberts, a friend who visited Kinerson occasionally when she was in the neighborhood. Kinerson recalled that somebody eventually pulled the two men apart. His next memory was waking up in the hospital one week later.
Bennett testified that on the evening in question, he had taken a bus to a friend’s house to shower because he had no hot water at home. As he walked past Kinerson’s home, which he recognized because Kinerson was a “known drug dealer in the area,” Kinerson tackled him into the street and began punching him, while a woman pepper-sprayed his eyes….Bennett testified that he was able to get away but then returned to retrieve his bag after another man told him he had left it behind. He then walked to his friend’s house across the street, removed his jacket on the porch, and took a shower to wash off the pepper spray. Bennett testified that he never stabbed Kinerson.
While the Supreme Court of Washington’s opinion is quite lengthy, the introduction pretty much lays out all you need to know about how it ruled:
Barclay Dylan Bennett appeals his conviction for first degree assault, arguing that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when it admitted an unavailable witness’s statement to a police officer suggesting that Bennett had a motive to commit the crime….The trial court allowed the State to introduce that statement only in response to other statements, first offered by Bennett, made by the same declarant as part of a single continuous interview with the officer. The court concluded that Bennett had “opened the door” to its admission….
As the parties’ arguments have developed on appeal, the issue has been framed in terms of several related doctrines: open door, invited error, curative admissibility, and waiver—all principles that may allow for the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence in response to one party’s actions. We need not explore these doctrines in depth or decide which one applies because the statement at issue here falls within the rule of completeness. This rule has deep roots in the common law and has been formalized in ER 106. It provides, “When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the party at that time to introduce any other part, or any other writing or recorded statement, which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.”…
The rule of completeness most often arises as a justification for allowing otherwise inadmissible hearsay, and at trial, the parties and the trial court characterized the challenged statement as such, with the trial court ruling that Bennett had “opened the door” to admission. On appeal, the State urges us to view the statement in the context of arguments about the adequacy of the police investigation and conclude that it does not constitute testimonial hearsay implicating Bennett’s Sixth Amendment confrontation right. Bennett responds that any evidentiary rule allowing for the admission of testimonial hearsay must yield to the confrontation clause….
We agree with the State. Bennett introduced a portion of the unavailable witness’s interview statement to show what information the police received during their investigation. Those portions supported an inference that the police knew about but failed to investigate another individual who may have had a motive to commit the assault. The trial court then permitted the State to introduce a subsequent statement from the witness’s interview, which supported an inference as to why the investigation focused solely on Bennett. The admitted statement satisfies the rule of completeness because it served to correct the misleading impression left by the statement Bennett introduced. Understood in this context, the admitted statement does not constitute testimonial hearsay, and we need not decide whether the rule of completeness conflicts with the confrontation clause. We affirm the Court of Appeals and uphold Bennett’s conviction.