Supreme Court of Colorado Rejects Involuntary Intoxication Defense For Defendant Who Claimed His Criminal Behavior Was Caused by “Something Unknown” in a Joint He Smoked
While most states do not allow for a voluntary intoxication defense, most states do allow for an involuntary intoxication defense. Such a defense applies when a defendant unknowingly ingests alcohol or drugs to the point of intoxication (e.g., a roommate comes home and eats her roommate’s freshly baked brownies, not knowing they are pot brownies). But what should happen if a defendant knowingly ingests a drug, but does not know that it was laced with another drug, etc.? That was the question of first impression addressed by the Supreme Court of Colorado in its recent opinion in People v. Mion, 2026 WL 191943 (Colo. 2026).
In Mion, “Isaac U. Mion was charged with aggravated robbery, menacing, and criminal mischief after an episode of erratic and violent behavior. At trial, Mion testified that his behavior was caused by ‘something unknown’ in a joint he smoked; he thus sought to raise the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication.” The trial court prevented him from doing so, and he was convicted, prompting his appeal to the state supreme court.
That court rejected his appeal, concluding as follows:
In making his arguments, Mion likens his claim to someone who knowingly drinks alcohol, but also unknowingly ingests a different drug that causes more severe intoxication. He therefore contends that defining the substance as the whole product would prohibit victims of a spiked drink from raising the involuntary intoxication defense. We are not persuaded.
This hypothetical defendant would have access to the involuntary intoxication defense under language in section 18-1-804(5) that creates an exception to the “[s]elf-induced intoxication” definition. Per the statute, even if a defendant knowingly introduced a substance and ought to have known that the substance was intoxicating, their intoxication is not self-induced if the substance was “introduced pursuant to medical advice or under circumstances that would afford a defense to a charge of crime.” § 18-1-804(5) (emphasis added).
While the language “under circumstances that would afford a defense to a charge of crime” may be ambiguous, it serves a purpose….Unlike Mion, when a person purchases an alcoholic drink from a licensed facility that is then secretly spiked, they have no reason to know that their drink was altered. Those circumstances would “afford a defense to a charge of crime” because these facts significantly negate the defendant’s intent to voluntarily intoxicate oneself.
The language of the “[s]elf-induced intoxication” definition in our present-day involuntary intoxication statute originally stems from, and is nearly identical to, section 2.08(5)(b) of the 1962 Model Penal Code.6 Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 2.08….A notation about the history of section 2.08 directs us to Tentative Draft No. 9 for the “original detailed commentary.”…This commentary states: “Of course, intoxication caused by the fraud of another is not self-induced.”…
In the spiked-drink situation, the circumstances foreseeably consist of fraud or trickery. A hypothetical bar-goer asks for a drink with specific alcohol, a “bourbon” or a “rum and coke,” but ends up consuming something different once the drink is spiked by another. But here, Mion presented no evidence that the “something unknown” was introduced through trickery or other such circumstance. He was simply handed an unspecified joint which he decided to smoke.
Accordingly, we conclude that Mion did not present sufficient evidence to entitle him to raise the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication.
dd