Eleventh Circuit Addresses the Admissibility of Rap Lyrics in Criminal Prosecutions
A topic that I’ve written about on this blog for more than a decade is the troubling trend of prosecutors introducing rap lyrics authored by defendants to prove that they committed crimes. That latest court to address the issue, albeit without a clear conclusion is the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Jones, 2026 WL 171773 (11th Cir. 2026).
In Jones, Hassan Jones was convicted of five counts: two related to drug distribution, two alleging illegal gun possession, and one alleging possession of a gun in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime.
After he was convicted, he successfully appealed his conviction for possession of a gun in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. Specifically, during his closing argument, the prosecutor drew the jury’s attention to Exhibit 19Z, which comprised a series of Jones’s Instagram messages. In connection with Count 3—possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime—the prosecutor said the following:
Take a look at Government’s Exhibit 19Z. Messages from the defendant’s Instagram. What are these about? “We got 1,700 apiece. I brought weed with my money and told you I would have eff after I sold it and you.” Right? What’s the defendant respond? “I’m through talking. I’m going to smoke you if you don’t have my money.”
All you need to know about the defendant’s possession of firearms in furtherance of drug dealing in one message.
The issue with this is that the prosecutor never entered Exhibit 19Z into evidence, leading to reversal of this conviction.
That left the other convictions and the issue of the prosecutor’s introduction of Jones’s rap lyrics at trial. The Eleventh Circuit addressed this issue as follows:
Jones separately challenges the introduction of (1) a 29-second video clip in which he raps and wields a gun, (2) a series of screenshots from a music video depicting him handling various firearms as well as images of drugs and cash, and (3) a note from his phone featuring what seem to be violent rap-music lyrics. He contends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting those items under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. In particular, Jones argues that that government couldn’t prove that the items depicted in what we’ll call the “rap-related evidence” were real and, therefore, that the evidence was both (1) irrelevant and (2) substantially more prejudicial than probative. The government responds that the evidence demonstrates that Jones handled weapons similar to the one seized from his apartment and that he possessed and conspired to distribute marijuana.
We agree with the government that the evidence meets the low relevance bar prescribed by Rules 401 and 402—namely, that a piece of evidence have “any tendency to make a fact more or less probable” and be “of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. A jury could conclude that the rap-related evidence made it somewhat “more…probable” that Jones possessed the contraband he was charged with possessing.
Rule 403 separately directs district courts to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed” by, among other things, “unfair prejudice.”…Here, as in a past case of ours, “the substance of the rap [evidence] was heavily prejudicial” because, as there, the videos and lyrics contained “violence [and] profanity” and “could reasonably be understood as promoting a violent and unlawful lifestyle.”…The government counters that the evidence is probative of “Jones’s knowing possession of the firearms” alongside “cash [ ] and marijuana similar to” that alleged in the indictment…
We’re skeptical. Like the evidence at issue in Gamory, the videos, screenshots, and lyrics have little relevance to Jones’s knowing possession of the two Glocks at issue here. See Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 493 (11th Cir. 2011). The government witness presenting the screenshots at trial couldn’t tell whether the guns shown were real or props, and on appeal the government doesn’t dispute Jones’s contention that “the guns depicted in the videos were not the guns charged in the indictment.”…Instead, it asserts only that the firearms (many of which weren’t Glocks) were “similar to that alleged in the superseding indictment.”…Add to that the fact that one of the YouTube videos included the disclaimer that “[a]ll props scenes and lyrics should not be taken seriously” and the probative value seems pretty low.
We needn’t definitively decide the Rule 403 issue, though, because we hold that any error in admitting the rap-related evidence was harmless. Even where a district court abuses its discretion in admitting disputed evidence, its error will be deemed harmless when we can say with “fair assurance” that the “judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.”…Here, the government presented substantial proof, rap-related items aside, that Jones knowingly possessed the two Glocks at issue here. And indeed, before us, Jones effectively admits as much: “At trial, the government introduced numerous exhibits not extracted from music videos that showed Mr. Jones talking about or handling drugs, guns, and cash, and the two guns charged in the superseding indictment were found in Mr. Jones’s bedroom with his DNA on them.”…We are satisfied the jury was presented with ample evidence to convict Jones on Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5.