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Editor: Colin Miller

Court of Appeals of Idaho Precludes Testimony on Juror Saying the Plaintiff Didn’t Need Money Because She’d Just Purchased a New Pickup

Similar to its federal counterpart, Idaho Rule of Evidence 606(b) states the following:

(b) During an Inquiry into the Validity of a Verdict or Indictment.

(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment.

The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters.

(2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether:

(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention;

(B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror; or

(C) the jury determined any issue by resort to chance; or

(D) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form.

In Mann v. North Canyon Medical Center, Inc., 2025 WL 1572290 (Idaho App. 2025), the Court of Appeals of Idaho found that a juror could not testify under Rule 606(b)(2)(A), but I’m not at all sure that the court got it right.

In Mann, Rebecca Mann appealed “from the jury’s verdict in favor of North Canyon Medical Center, finding that physician assistant, Jason Davis, did not breach the standard of care in evaluating Harve Mann’s symptoms and coordinating transfer of care to a Boise neurosurgeon when imaging showed an unruptured brain aneurysm.”

After the jury’s verdict, Mann appealed, alleging “juror misconduct on the part of juror no. 3 by stating, during deliberations, that Mann had just purchased a new pickup, so she did not need the money. Mann assert[ed] that the observation was extraneous and cites to a dictionary definition of ‘extraneous.'”

In finding that juror testimony on this topic was inadmissible, the Court of Appeals of Idaho ruled as follows:

Turning to I.R.E. 606(b)(2)(A), the information must be both extraneous and prejudicial…Jurors are allowed to bring with them their background, knowledge, and experience, therefore, only a specific fact brought to a juror’s attention outside of the trial itself should be considered extraneous….As to whether juror no. 3’s comment was extraneous, the district court noted that it was unclear how juror no. 3 came to possess the information and that it was entirely possible that it was part of the juror’s background living in a small community.

The district court noted that even if this information was extraneous, it was not prejudicial. First, there was no evidence that his comment was heard by jurors other than the foreperson. Second, the court noted that because the jury did not reach damages, the notion of whether the plaintiff needed money was not prejudicial. Mann fails to demonstrate that the district court’s findings and conclusions are erroneous. The court did not err in denying Mann’s motion for new trial based on juror no. 3.

The first part of this is fairly straightforward. If Juror #3 had preexisting knowledge of Mann’s new pickup, there would not be grounds for jury impeachment. But, if Juror #3 gained this knowledge during the course of trial, there might be grounds for jury impeachment.

Turning to the second part of this, I disagree on both points. First, I don’t see how the court could conclude that Juror #3’s knowledge/statement was not prejudicial just because other jurors didn’t hear it. She said it, and the jury foreperson heard it. This means that the new pickup could have changed both of their votes, at a minimum. Second, it seems to me that Juror #3’s knowledge about Mann’s new pickup absolutely could have convinced him to rule against Mann on liability. The mere fact that the jury didn’t reach damages should be beside the point.

-CM