Court of Appeals of North Carolina Reverses Murder Conviction Based on Defense Counsel Admitting Client’s Guilt Without His Consent

Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s opinion in McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018),

With individual liberty—and, in capital cases, life—at stake, it is the defendant’s prerogative, not counsel’s, to decide on the objective of his defense: to admit guilt in the hope of gaining mercy at the sentencing stage, or to maintain his innocence, leaving it to the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Similarly, in State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175, 179 (1985), the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that

When counsel admits his client’s guilt without first obtaining the client’s consent, the client’s rights to a fair trial and to put the State to the burden of proof are completely swept away. The practical effect is the same as if counsel had entered a plea of guilty without the client’s consent.

A good example of defense counsel violating the right to autonomy recognized in McCoy and Harbison can be found in the recent opinion of the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in State v. Meadows, 2025 WL 1317705 (N.C. App. 2025).

In Meadows, Deonte Meadows was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon and first-degree murder in connection with a home invasion. At trial, the

defendant maintained his innocence throughout trial and during the only Harbison inquiry at trial, gave his counsel consent to discuss only his previous conviction of felony fleeing to evade arrest. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that at any other point before or during trial defendant’s counsel sought or obtained informed consent from defendant to discuss his presence at the crime scene or his involvement with the gang the evening of the incident. Accordingly, the record reflects that defendant gave consent to discuss his previous conviction, but not his presence at the crime scene, which coupled with the fact that defendant maintained his innocence throughout trial leads us to the conclusion that defendant did not knowingly or voluntarily consent to an admission that he was present at the crime scene during closing argument.

That said, during closing argument, defense counsel told the jury the following:

What is the point? It shows at least one of the shooters, terrified, don’t know what he’s doing, necessary or unnecessary, just firing, because he was in a state of panic, under high stress. Doesn’t want to be there. Evidence doesn’t show anything about Deonte’s state of mind, but what we do know is he went there under the orders of these higher-ups. I submit to you that it is reasonable to suppose he was only concerned about himself, only concerned about carrying out orders of his higher-ups. He had no intent whatsoever. He was supposed to act the way — he was trying to act the way he was supposed to under these circumstances.

But we know a little bit more about — if you are to believe the State’s evidence — if you were to draw the State’s evidence, it he was, indeed, Deonte; it was indeed Deonte who left one shoe or two shoes on the roadway; we also know a little bit more. He’s terrified. Ms. Morton took pains to explain to you there was only one person in the house, unarmed. They know he was there. But how does, allegedly, Deonte act? Terrified. It’s like Jurassic Park. Dinos are coming. He’s running, shoe falls off. He’s in such a hurry, he doesn’t even have the time to put the shoe back on, if you were to believe that’s what happened, based on the State’s evidence.

According to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, this was grounds for a new trial for the following reasons:

Here, defendant’s counsel admitted that defendant, although he had no choice, followed orders from other gang members who were in a higher position than defendant and conceded that defendant went along with them to the victim’s house. Defendant’s counsel effectively confirmed Ms. Burton’s testimony when she discussed the call defendant had received from Ducc and Chapo on the night of the incident. This amounts to an implied admission that although defendant was following orders, he was also a participant in the crime in question.

While recognizing the McAllister Court’s admonition “that a finding of Harbison error based on an implied concession of guilt should be a rare occurrence[,]” McAllister, 375 N.C. at 376, we believe defendant’s counsel’s statements in this case present such a rare occurrence. Accordingly, defendant’s counsel committed a per se Harbison violation in violation of defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to effective counsel by making an implied admission of guilt without defendant’s consent. We arrest judgment and remand for a new trial.

-CM