Court of Appeals of Utah Reverses Manslaughter Conviction Based on Detective Improperly Testifying to Legal Conclusions
Similar to its federal counterpart, Utah Rule of Evidence 704(a) states that “An opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.” But while witnesses can offer opinion testimony that embraces ultimate factual issues, they are not allowed to offer ultimate legal conclusions. A good example of this dividing line can be found in yesterday’s opinion of the Court of Appeals of Utah in State v. Brown, 2025 WL 1131705 (Utah App. 2025).
In Brown,
Patrick Koaneil Brown admit[ted] he shot and killed David following a heated exchange, but he maintain[ed] he acted in self-defense. He claim[ed] that he tried to deescalate the situation, his efforts failed, and when David rammed his car into the back of Brown’s car, he felt he had no choice but to shoot David. A jury found Brown guilty of murder, but the conviction was reduced to manslaughter because the jury credited Brown’s claim of imperfect self-defense. Brown was also convicted of multiple counts of discharge of a weapon. At trial, a detective (Detective) was allowed to testify, over Brown’s objection, that David’s ramming of Brown’s car constituted criminal mischief under the law, essentially explaining why the instruction on perfect self-defense, which the jury would soon confront, would not apply.
In finding that the detective’s opinion testimony was improperly admitted under Rule 704(a) and grounds for reversal, the Court of Appeals of Utah ruled as follows:
Here, Detective’s testimony was clearly tied to Utah Code section 76-2-402(2)(b), which requires a forcible felony to justify deadly force in self-defense, and section 76-2-402(1)(a), which specifically includes aggravated assault and not criminal mischief within the definition of forcible felony. Utah law states that “[a]n individual is justified in using force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury if the individual reasonably believes that force is necessary to … prevent the commission of a forcible felony.”…And Utah law’s definition of “forcible felony” specifically includes “aggravated assault” but not criminal mischief….Accordingly, whether the circumstances here amounted to a forcible felony, as opposed to criminal mischief, was a question with which the jury would be directly confronted. Indeed, the jury instructions directed the jury to determine whether Brown had been faced with a forcible felony. The instructions further defined “forcible felony” to include “aggravated assault.”
At trial, Detective testified about how David’s actions would have qualified only as “criminal mischief” and not as “aggravated assault.” In his briefing, Brown explains that his “defense was that [David] committed a forcible felony when he rammed his car into Brown’s car and that Brown had a right to use deadly force to defend that forcible felony.” So, Brown concludes, “when Detective was allowed to repeatedly and conclusively testify that [David] ramming his car into the back of Brown’s car was ‘criminal mischief rather than an aggravated-assault-type thing[,]’…his testimony foreclosed Brown’s claim of perfect self-defense.” Brown complains that “Detective’s testimony directly and significantly undermined Brown’s claim of perfect self-defense.”
Of course, “when witnesses have used a term in its ordinary meaning rather than its legal meaning, we have determined that their testimony was appropriately admitted.”…But “criminal mischief” doesn’t really have an ordinary meaning, and it’s hardly a term used in day-to-day parlance. It is difficult to conjure up a purpose for Detective to be testifying to the difference between aggravated assault and criminal mischief and their relevance here other than to undermine the jury’s independent role by concluding for it that no aggravated assault had occurred. Thus, it’s clear that Detective offered improper legal conclusions at trial by directly tying his testimony to the requirements of Utah law and instructing the jury on the correct legal resolution of issues within its purview. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in overruling Brown’s objection to this testimony.
-CM