Illinois Court Reverses 1st Degree Murder Conviction Due to Judge’s Refusal to Instruct the Jury on 2nd Degree Murder

March 4, 2025

When a defendant is charged with a crime, the court must instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses if such offenses are plausibly supported by the evidence. As such, when a court fails to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses despite them being supported by the record, it can be grounds for a new trial. And, indeed, that’s exactly what happened in the recent case, People v. Colbert, 2025 WL 301003 (Ill.App. 5th 2025).

In Colbert, “[f]ollowing a jury trial, the defendant, Arieana F. Colbert, was convicted of first degree murder with intent to kill Acarrie Ingram-Triner.” At the close of the case, the defense moved for a jury instruction on second degree murder under a theory of imperfect self-defense. The judge denied the motion, ruling as follows:

THE COURT: Just so the record is clear when I’m ruling on this particular instruction request I am applying the law which is the same law that I did apply earlier this morning whether I mentioned it or not which is that instructions are to be given to a jury if there’s any evidence however slight. It can be inconsistent. It can even be against a defendant’s own testimony. If there’s some evidence in the record if believed by a jury would support a lesser included or a mitigating charge it is to be given. It is not up to the judge to decide the credibility of the witnesses. That’s up to the jury.

So, the question that I had this morning and the question I have now here today is where is the specific evidence for imperfect self-defense. Just like I considered earlier, where was the evidence to support the other claims.

The Defendant did at one moment say that she felt fear for her safety and thought there could be continuing problems in the future. However, imperfect self-defense means that there are some facts to support self-defense however it’s unreasonable objectively, so I have to look at what is self-defense. Self-defense is unlawful force being threatened against her.

She was not the aggressor. It was imminent danger of harm and she actually and subjectively believed a danger existed that required the use of force and that her beliefs were reasonable and if those beliefs were unreasonable or the factors are unreasonable then it potentially would be second degree, but the fact is that she did testify that there were times when she was the aggressor. She did state at times at one point that there was a possibility that these unnamed brothers might come back and have more trouble and when she shot the gun she doesn’t remember dropping anything the instant before she shot. She doesn’t recall that at all. She just shot without thinking. She said she reacted without time to think. She doesn’t know why she shot her.

I would note that it appears that she was holding something. She fell to the ground, stepped down, something fell, she picked it up and fired. With those objective facts whether you believe the Defendant or you believe the other witnesses the facts are really nothing to support again that there was going to be imminent harm to her, certainly not imminent harm of—that could cause death or great bodily harm. There were times, including near the end, when she was, in fact, the aggressor because the victim was actually backing up at the time, and therefore I can’t find that there’s a good faith basis of facts however slight to support the mitigating charge of second degree based on imperfect self-defense.

Therefore, the Court is going to deny the request for the instructions that the defense has proposed.

In reversing Colbert’s conviction, the appellate court ruled as follows:

The defendant argues that a mitigating factor of imperfect self-defense was presented that she subjectively believed she was acting in self-defense even if that belief was objectively unreasonable, and, thus, we should reverse her conviction for first degree murder and remand for a new trial. As previously noted, a defendant is entitled to an instruction on second degree murder if there is some evidence in the record to support her claim that a mitigating circumstance is present….The record discloses that at the hearing on the defendant’s motion for new trial, the trial court struggled with whether “the right thing to do” would have been to give the jury the option of second degree murder. In fact, the trial court was so conflicted by this issue that he presciently acknowledged that if he was to ever be reversed in a criminal case, it would be this one. Unfortunately for the trial court, we agree. A fair reading of the record shows that even the State believed the defendant was entitled to a second degree instruction based on imperfect self-defense since its suggestion prompted defense counsel to prepare such a jury instruction for the trial court’s review following the lunch break.

We disagree with the State’s position that this was harmless error. “[I]nstructional errors are deemed harmless if it is demonstrated that the result of the trial would not have been different had the jury been properly instructed.”…Here, the defendant presented some evidence, albeit slight, that she had the subjective belief that she was acting in self-defense. Thus, “it was for the jury to determine if the defendant did, in fact, have the subjective belief and, if so, that the belief was reasonable or unreasonable under the circumstances.”…“Pursuant to Lockett and its progeny, it was a question of fact as to whether defendant’s belief was reasonable or unreasonable.”…Here, as in Washington, the trial court took the factual determination away from the jury when it refused to give a second degree murder instruction. Based upon this record, we cannot say that the result of the trial would not have been different had the jury received a second degree murder instruction where there was some evidence in the record that, if believed by the jury, would have reduced the crime charged to the lesser offense of second degree murder.