Supreme Court of Indiana Finds “Eggshell Plaintiff” Doctrine Applies in Murder & Manslaughter Trials

The “eggshell plaintiff” or “eggshell skull” doctrine generally “holds that holds that a defendant’s liability in a tort claim is not mitigated by a plaintiff’s unforeseeable, pre-existing susceptibility to injury.” Last February, I did a blog post about the Court of Appeals of Indiana finding that the “eggshell plaintiff” doctrine doesn’t apply to murder or manslaughter cases, ruling as follows:

The State does not cite, nor can we locate, any Indiana cases where the eggshell-victim doctrine was applied to a murder or voluntary-manslaughter case to establish that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed someone. A search of other jurisdictions doesn’t reveal many cases, but those we found support that the eggshell-victim doctrine doesn’t apply to murder or voluntary-manslaughter cases. As the Seventh Circuit has explained:

The eggshell-skull principle does not quite fit a case of intentional murder, for the murderer must intend his victim’s death and ordinarily this will presuppose some awareness of the likely consequences of his act. It is not murder to kill a person by a slight blow harmless to an ordinary person if you do not know the person is unusually vulnerable; there is even a presumption in Illinois that one who beats another with his bare fists does not intend to kill him….

Now, in Konkle v. State, 2025 WL 782333 (Ind. 2025), the Supreme Court of Indiana has reversed this ruling.

In Konkle, Michael Steele was killed during a fight with Zachariah Konkle at Poor Jack Amusements, “a traveling carnival that operates at numerous county fairs throughout Indiana.” During the fight, Konkle “was unaware that Steele had several pre-existing heart conditions, including cardiovascular disease, significantly blocked coronary arteries, and an enlarged heart.”

At Kunkle’s trial, during which the jury was instructed on murder, voluntary manslaughter, reckless homicide, and involuntary manslaughter, the prosecutor argued as follows during closing argument:

There’s a principle of the law called the eggshell victim rule, sometimes called the eggshell plaintiff rule, sometimes called the eggshell skull rule. A longstanding rule I mean read it literally because this – I didn’t type this up. A longstanding rule of criminal law and tort, that’s civil law, that a defendant takes his victim as he finds him. And this is where the phrase goes, if one throws a piece of chalk at a victim with an eggshell skull and the chalk strikes the victim and fractures his skull, the perpetrator would be guilty even if he didn’t intend to bring bodily harm. That’s essentially saying if somebody picks on somebody who for one reason or another, health, age, is weak, as a perpetrator you don’t get a bonus for picking on a weakling. Does that make sense? Next slide please. A defendant is liable for aggravation or exacerbation of a current injury. Somebody has a heart condition and you cause them to have a heart condition you’re liable for that. Again, I’m not making this up. Indiana Supreme Court law from 10-11 years ago.

In addressing Kunkle’s ensuing appeal, the Supreme Court of Indiana began by noting that, “unlike with battery, the eggshell skull doctrine has not been applied to murder or its kindred in this state. To the extent that other courts have considered the doctrine in murder or voluntary manslaughter cases, there is some guidance to consult.” The court then consulted: (1) Brackett v. Peters, 11 F.3d 78, 81–82 (7th Cir. 1993), which applied the eggshell plaintiff doctrine to the causation component of felony murder (while distinguishing felony murder from intentional murder); and (2) State v. O’Bannon, 274 P.3d 992 (Utah Ct. App. 2012), which applied the eggshell plaintiff doctrine to a felony child abuse case.

According to the court,

These cases help us determine that the eggshell skull doctrine can be applied both inside and outside the context of murder. Moreover, as the eggshell skull doctrine is one of causation, and causation is a required element in proving a criminal conviction, it only makes sense that the doctrine be applied for such purposes. This concept is clearly demonstrated in each of the cases discussed thus far. But as O’Bannon and Brackett further illustrate, the doctrine should not be construed to alleviate the State’s burden to prove any requisite intent elements. In fact, the doctrine should not be invoked for proving mens rea, period. The Seventh Circuit explicitly recognized this limiting principle. In intentional murder cases specifically, a victim’s preexisting ailment will be of no concern where a murderer’s intentional actions will result in the victim’s death regardless of whether a preexisting condition exists….Therefore, because the eggshell skull doctrine has traditionally dwelled within an analysis of causation—whether in tort or criminal law—our ruling today clarifies that this is where it should dwell hereafter.

-CM