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Editor: Colin Miller

Supreme Court of Minnesota Finds Rule 410 Waiver Triggered in Murder Trial

Similar to its federal counterpart, Minnesota Rule of Evidence 410 provides that

Evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime or of statements made in connection with any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil, criminal, or administrative action, case, or proceeding whether offered for or against the person who made the plea or offer.

That said, the protections of Rule 410 can be, and often are, waived by defendants to get to the plea bargaining table. The question then becomes whether that waiver is triggered. A good recent example can be found in the recent opinion by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in State v. Segura, 2024 WL 358029 (Minn. 2024).

In Segura, Elsa Segura was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree intentional murder while committing a felony (kidnapping), and kidnapping to commit great bodily harm or terrorize, all premised on aiding-and-abetting theories of criminal liability. Before trial, Segura had engaged in plea bargaining with the prosecution after signing a waiver containing the following clause:

If, during this meeting, Elsa Segura implicates herself in any crime, any statements Ms. Segura makes during the meeting will not be offered as evidence in the State’s case-in-chief against her. Statements made by Ms. Segura during the meeting may only be used to cross-examine … her should she testify at trial.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Minnesota found that this waiver was triggered at trial, ruling as follows:

On direct examination, Segura testified that, after she became aware of Baugh’s death, she told investigators about the calls she had made to Baugh. On cross-examination, the State questioned Segura about her motive for speaking to law enforcement and statements she made during the proffer meeting that were inconsistent with her trial testimony.[19] We conclude that Segura’s proffer statements were admissible as impeachment evidence as it pertained to her bias and her prior inconsistent statements. Accordingly, Segura has failed to establish an error. Segura’s argument that the district court committed reversible error by admitting evidence related to her proffer statements is without merit.

[19] For instance, Segura acknowledged, in response to the State’s questioning, that she provided information to law enforcement “to get a plea deal.” After Segura testified on direct examination that J.M.-M. had been at her house “four to five times” and that she would not characterize him as a friend, the State impeached Segura with a statement she made during the proffer meeting in which she said she was friends with J.M.-M.

-CM