Supreme Court of Indiana Upholds Murder Conviction Despite Evidence of Gross Misconduct by Juror

In its recent opinion in Loehrlein v. State, 2020 WL 7238307 (Ind. 2020), the Supreme Court of Indiana correctly noted that

“Generally, proof that a juror was biased against the defendant or lied during voir dire entitles a defendant to a new trial.” State v. Dye, 784 N.E.2d 469, 473 (Ind. 2003) (quoting Warner v. State, 773 N.E.2d 239, 246 (Ind. 2002)). A defendant seeking a new trial because of juror misconduct must show two things: 1) gross misconduct; and 2) that the gross misconduct probably harmed the defendant. Id. 

So, why do I think the court botched its analysis?

In in Loehrlein, the defendant “was charged with the murder and attempted murder of his family members.” In her jury questionnaire, an attorney and prospective juror named L.W.

wrote “N/A,” meaning not applicable, in response to questions on her jury questionnaire when those answers should have been a yes. That is, the juror answered not applicable to questions about both her past criminal history and whether she had herself been victim of a crime. However, she had in fact been charged with a crime and had been the victim of domestic abuse.

In terms of gross misconduct, the Supreme Court of Indiana concluded as follows:

We find L.W.’s conduct even more egregious because she is an attorney who had previously handled some criminal matters and as such, she should have known better. In this regard, her conduct is more egregious than the juror in Warner. Perhaps we would be in a different position had she not been an attorney or even if she was more open and honest during her post-trial deposition. She was not though. Because her answers on the jury questionnaire were cryptic1 and her demeanor during her post-trial deposition was defensive and evasive, we find that her misconduct was gross.

But the court did not find probable harm. Instead, the court noted that

The issue during trial wasn’t whether Loehrlein committed the offenses but rather whether he was sane at the time. Although his expert testified that Loehrlein was suffering from a mental disease or defect and could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions, she based this opinion on the fact that she believed there was a difference between legal and moral wrong. She conceded he knew what he was doing was legally wrong.

Further, both court appointed experts here testified that Loehrlein was not suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of the crime and was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions. Finally, although L.W. committed gross misconduct, the one thing she was unequivocal about during her deposition was that she was impartial.

We would perhaps be in a different situation if the evidence were closer regarding Loehrlein’s sanity or if the issue to be determined at trial was whether he harmed his family.

This sounds reasonable enough, but it’s not how the probable harm test is supposed to be done. In Dye, the Supreme Court of Indiana observed that

The United States Supreme Court articulated a particularized test for determining whether a new trial is required due to juror deceit during voir dire or on jury questionnaires in McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984). The two-part test states that in order to obtain a new trial, the defendant “must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question…and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.”

In other words, a defendant suffers probable harm from a prospective juror lying on voir dire if an honest answer would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause, which is what the court found in Dye.

And so, in Loehrlein, the question shouldn’t have been about the strength of the evidence against the defendant but instead whether the prospective juror could have been challenged for cause if she said she was “charged with a crime and had been the victim of domestic abuse.” And given that the defendant was charged with killing and trying to kill family members, there indeed might have been (or not) grounds for a challenge for cause, but the court never addressed the issue.

-CM