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Editor: Colin Miller

Court of Appeals of Idaho Finds Lack of Corroborating Circumstances for Statement Against Interest

Similar to its federal counterpart, Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) provides an exception to the rule against hearsay for

A statement that:

(A)  a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have made only if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the declarant’s proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to invalidate the declarant’s claim against someone else or to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability; and

(B)  is supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the declarant to criminal liability.

So what corroborating circumstances are sufficient to establish the trustworthiness needed to admit a statement against interest under subsection (B). This was the question addressed by the Court of Appeals of Idaho in its recent opinion in State v. Blake, 2020 WL 6882112 (Idaho App. 2020).

In Blake, Cody Ryan Blake

was on felony probation and living with his father at his father’s residence in Boise when officers conducted a compliance check. Blake’s father gave the officers permission to search Blake’s locked bedroom. In the bedroom, the officers discovered multiple baggies of methamphetamine weighing approximately 52.8 grams; a prescription bottle with Blake’s name printed on it containing methamphetamine; a digital scale; and three smoking devices.

After Blake pleaded not guilty to various drug offenses,

Blake filed a motion in limine seeking to admit into evidence at trial a letter purportedly written by Brandon Bankston. In the letter, Bankston assert[ed] that in September 2018, he was staying at Blake’s father’s residence; Bankston was “abruptly asked to leave” the residence; he “left a felony amount of methamphetamine…stashed around the toys” “along with some paraphernalia” in the room in which he was staying; he was unable to return to the residence to retrieve the drugs; he later learned from his girlfriend that “his friend’s son” had been “arrested for this controlled substance that was in the back bedroom”; and “Mr. Blake’s son could [have] in no way shape or form actually possessed any knowledge of the substance being in the house because he had no access to the room it was found in nor did he have any knowledge or control of the substance found.”

The court denied Blake’s motion in limine, finding that there were not corroborating circumstances clearly indicating the trustworthiness of Bankston’s letter. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Idaho

disagree[d] with Blake’s argument that the evidence corroborates Bankston’s statements in his letter for several reasons. First, contrary to Blake’s argument that Bankston’s letter is “not vague,” the letter lacks important foundational details. For example, the letter only identifies generally when Bankston left the residence and does not provide the exact date he left, leaving unanswered the question of how long the drugs were in Bankston’s room before Blake returned to his father’s residence. Further, the letter does not describe the location of the room in which Bankston stayed at the residence to establish that the room indeed was the same room Blake occupied. The letter does not specifically name any individuals but rather refers to Bankston as “staying [with] a friend” and learning from his unnamed “girlfriend” that his “friend’s son” was arrested. Finally, the letter does not specifically describe the paraphernalia, the drugs, or where they were hidden in the room; rather, it only refers to a “felony amount of methamphetamine” “stashed around the toys.” The absence of these details calls into question the trustworthiness of Bankston’s statements.
Second, assuming Bankston’s claim is true that he was not staying at the residence when law enforcement discovered the methamphetamine, then many of the statements in his letter contain information necessarily beyond his personal knowledge. For example, if Bankston was no longer staying at the residence, then he could not have personally known that the drugs were found “in the back bedroom” or that “his friend’s son” had “zero knowledge of [the drug’s] existence,” “had no access to the room” in which the drugs were found, and “did not have any knowledge [or] control” of the drugs. Also, Blake’s failure to identify Bankston as an individual who had access to Blake’s room further undermines Bankston’s suggestion that he has personal knowledge of where the drugs were located and whether Blake had knowledge of, access to, and control of the drugs.
Third, Bankston’s psychological and physical surroundings–including that Bankston and Blake were incarcerated together–could have affected the trustworthiness of Bankston’s statements in his letter. As Deputy Brooks’s affidavit established, Bankston and Blake were incarcerated in the Ada County Jail and resided in the same housing unit from December 2 until December 6. Importantly, December 6 is the same date Bankston mailed his letter to Blake’s counsel. Blake did not object to Deputy Brooks’s affidavit below, and Blake’s assertion that the district court “speculated” about Bankston and Blake’s relationship when calling them “cellmates” does not render the court’s findings erroneous. The evidence shows a likely relationship between Blake and Bankston based both on Bankston’s description of Blake as “his friend’s son” and on Blake and Bankston’s incarceration together on the same date that Bankston mailed his letter to Blake’s counsel. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Bankston’s psychological and physical surroundings and his relationship to Blake impact the trustworthiness of Bankston’s letter.

-CM