The Real Article: 4th Circuit Allows Lay Authentication of Letter in Latin Kings Trial
Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) states that
To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.
Furthermore, Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b) provides illustrations of particular ways in which a party can satisfy this authentication requirement; specifically, Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(2) states that the authentication requirement can be satisfied through
A nonexpert’s opinion that handwriting is genuine, based on a familiarity with it that was not acquired for the current litigation.
Importantly, Rule 901(b)(2) allows for non-expert authentication, as was the case in United States v. Cornell, 2015 WL 1137153 (4th Cir. 2015).
In Cornell, a jury convicted Jorge Cornell, Russell Kilfoil, and Ernesto Wilson of conspiracy to violate the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) based on their activities in connection with the Greensboro, North Carolina chapter of the Latin Kings gang. Evidence adduced at trial also indicated that Jason Yates was a former member of the Latin Kings gang. At trial, the prosecution admitted
a handwritten letter found in the common area of [Cornell’s] home. Addressed from “Squrl” to “Jay,” the letter warned Jay that federal authorities were investigating him and they had contacted possible cooperating witnesses. The letter also acknowledged “bad blood” between the two men….To authenticate this document, the Government offered testimony that former gang member Jason Yates and Cornell used the aliases “King Squirrel” and “King Jay,” respectively, and that Yates had previously come into conflict with Cornell in gang politics. The Government also disclosed that authorities had approached Yates about cooperating in this case, and thus he knew of the investigation.
After he was convicted, Cornell appealed, claiming that the letter was improperly authenticated. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, concluding that
The letter purports to be two things: a correspondence written by Yates and received by Cornell. As to the former, the Government presented lay testimony that the letter was in Yates’ handwriting. Contrary to Cornell’s suggestion otherwise, this type of evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Yates was the author. See Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(2).
Specifically, Jose Argomaniz testified at trial that “he had known Jason Yates for 13 years, growing up with him in Illinois, and had exchanged letters with him two or three times when he was in prison. Argomaniz recognized his signature and his writing.”
-CM