My New Essay: The Purpose Driven Rule: Drew Peterson, Giles v. California, and the Transferred Intent Doctrine of Forfeiture by Wrongdoing

Well, after posts ther last several days about the Drew Peterson conviction and the transferred intent doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, I finally put my thoughts together in essay entitled, The Purpose Driven Rule: Drew Peterson, Giles v. California, and the Transferred Intent Doctrine of Forfeiture by Wrongdoing. That essay is now available on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

On September 6, 2012, a jury convicted DrewPeterson of the murder of his third wife, Kathleen Savio. Media accounts of theverdict indicated that jurors were primarily swayed by the admission of hearsaystatements by Savio as well as Peterson’s third wife, Stacy Peterson.  Numerous stories reported that theprosecution admitted these hearsay statements pursuant to “Drew’s Law,” astatutory codification of the common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing thatthe Illinois legislature enacted solely for purposes of the Petersonprosecution.  In fact, these statementswere admitted under the common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, andthe viability of Peterson’s appeal hinges upon the constitutionality of thetransferred intent doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.

The doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoingtypically applies in the witness tampering context:  When a defendant on trial for some crime (e.g., robbery) intends to and doesprocure the unavailability of a prospective witness against him at that trial, the prosecution can admitthe witness’s hearsay statements at thatsame trial (the robbery trial).  Butdoes the doctrine also apply at the defendant’s trial for murdering theprospective witness, with the defendant’s intent to render the witnessunavailable at the first trial transferring to the second trial?  This essay contends that the Supreme Court’sopinion in Giles v. Califonriaendorsed a transferred intent doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing by makingthe operation of the doctrine dependent upon causation and intent rather than causation and benefit. 

-CM